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Examining the Ethics of Environmental Offsets:  
A Response to Biocentric Objections to Biodiversity Offsetting 
     Meredyth Merrow* 
 
Biodiversity is the totality of all inherited variation in the life forms of 
Earth, of which we are one species.  We study and save it to our great 
benefit.  We ignore and degrade it to our great peril. 
 
- E. O. Wilson 
I. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, biodiversity offsetting has become a 
popular (and controversial) policy tool, designed to combat the destruction 
of ecosystems for development projects by counterbalancing losses of 
biodiversity in one place and generating equivalent biodiversity benefits in 
another.1  As offset schemes become increasingly acceptable around the 
world, environmental ethicists—particularly biocentrists—have raised 
concerns about the moral implications of these programs.  They maintain 
that monetizing biodiversity, and thereby treating it as a tradable 
commodity, leads to an erosion of ethical barriers, to the detriment of the 
environment.2 
In this paper, I critically examine the existing literature on the ethics 
of environmental offsets and address two specific biocentric critiques of 
biodiversity offsetting raised by Maron, Monbiot, Walker, Ives and 
Bekessy.  First, I address the argument that nature is not fungible, and 
consider the challenges arising from assigning value to biodiversity.  Next, 
I assess the claim that biodiversity offsetting represents a shift in our ethical 
approach to conservation, which may lead to a diminished sense of moral 
duty and exacerbate environmental harm.3  
 
*  I would like to thank David Takacs for his infinite wisdom and unwavering support on a 
subject that is near and dear to his heart. I would also like to thank Elizabeth Lockwood for 
her keen insights and for the countless hours she spent discussing this topic with me.   
       1.     Martine Maron, Christopher Ives, et al., Taming a Wicked Problem: Resolving 
Controversies in Biodiversity Offsetting, 66 BIOSCI. 6, 489 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/Y9TG-YVLA. 
2.     See generally, Christopher Ives & Sarah Bekessy, The Ethics of Offsetting 
Nature, 13 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & THE ENV’T, 568 (2015); Maron et al., supra note 1. 
3. Ives & Bekessy, supra, note 2, at 568. 
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I conclude that, instead of examining biodiversity offsetting as a 
means of “conservation,”4 we should instead treat offsets within the context 
of “development.”  By evaluating the usefulness and appropriateness of 
biodiversity offsets in the context of development, I resolve that 
biodiversity offsetting does not facilitate the unraveling of our ethical 
obligations to the natural world, but rather, cultivates a new responsibility 
to the environment by imparting a previously-unrealized obligation to 
preserve biodiversity in the context of development.  By fostering this 
obligation in development practices world-wide, we proliferate the ethic 
that man does indeed have responsibilities to nature.  If we are to 
accommodate an estimated human population of eleven billion by 2100, 
there is no getting around the need for additional development.5  We can 
either meet this reality by implementing all the tools we have available to 
us now, or we can resist and perish.  By framing offsetting as a development 
ethic, I believe we can channel our energies into making these programs 
work more equitably for the human and nonhuman world. 
II. The Rise of Biodiversity Offsetting in Practice 
Since the implementation of wetland mitigation banking under the 
Clean Water Act in the United States in 1980,6 offset schemes have 
expanded to account for impacts to a variety of environmental concerns, 
including trades for habitat, species, and carbon.7  Biodiversity offsets are 
defined as “conservation actions intended to compensate for the residual, 
unavoidable harm to biodiversity caused by development projects, so as to 
ensure no net loss of biodiversity.”8  As the impacts of climate change and 
human pollution continue to degrade global ecosystems at an alarming rate, 
the use of offsets to mitigate biodiversity losses has proliferated in recent 
 
4. To the furor of environmental purists. 
5. United Nations Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Aff., Growing at a Slower Pace, World 
Population is Expected to Reach 9.7 Billion in 2050 and Could Peak at Nearly 11 Billion 
Around 2100 (June 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/K8ZJ-4699. 
6. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, U.S. EPA. (Apr. 2019), https://perma.cc/ 
6CRV-8BEP; see also, Wetlands Protection and Restoration, U.S. EPA. (Aug. 2018), 
https://perma.cc/5FDQ-AFU3. 
7. William Latimer & David Hill, Mitigation Banking: Securing No Net Loss to 
Biodiversity?, FOREST TRENDS ASS’N. (date unknown), https://perma.cc/B92T-HCKC. 
8. Biodiversity Offsets, INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE (Sept. 2016), 
https://perma.cc/M9UZ-UD59 (emphasis added). 
2 - MERROW_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019  3:22 PM 




years.9  As of 2015, “[a]t least fifty nations are currently implementing 
biodiversity offsetting or have plans to do so.”10 
Proponents of biodiversity offsets praise the programs for providing 
a much needed balance between development and conservation, and for 
offering a workable middle ground to appease governments, 
environmentalists, developers, and policy-makers.  They argue that 
implementing biodiversity offsets as measures of “last resort” for 
“unavoidable losses” of biodiversity can achieve “measurable conservation 
outcomes.”11  Empirical evidence supports the fact that “in many cases, 
even low-quality, incomplete, impermanent, poorly implemented 
biodiversity offset approaches … provide more positive outcomes for 
biodiversity than the status quo,” in which compensation for residual losses 
of biodiversity is usually absent or inadequate.12 
The goal of biodiversity offsetting is to achieve a “no net loss,” or 
preferably, a “net gain,” of biodiversity “with respect to species 
composition, habitat structure, ecosystem function and people’s use and 
cultural values associated with biodiversity.”13  While national, regional, 
and local practices vary in their implementation of biodiversity offsetting 
programs, “one point is clear: offsetting is an increasingly important 
mechanism for conservation as more companies use them to mitigate their 
biodiversity impacts.”14 
The uptake in international support and implementation of 
biodiversity offsetting programs has raised some alarm for a number of 
environmentalists.  They argue that allowing developers to degrade 
biodiversity in one place, in exchange for paying to protect biodiversity 
elsewhere, creates an unethical conservation framework wherein nature can 
be bought, bartered, and sold.15  Critics of biodiversity offsetting argue that 
once the principle of commodifying nature is established, nature will 
 
9.     Ives & Bekessy, supra note 2, at 568. 
10. David Takacs, Are Koalas Fungible? Biodiversity Offsetting and the Law, 26 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 2, 165–66 (2018), https://perma.cc/7JAK-4HMQ. 
11. Jonathan Ekstrom et al., Independent Report on Biodiversity Offsets, INT’L 
COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS (Jan. 7, 2013), https://perma.cc/KT2D-CDMD. 
12. Technical Conditions for Positive Outcomes from Biodiversity Offsets, INT’L 
UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE (2014), https://perma.cc/SF54-EZ5E. 
13. Ekstrom et al., supra note 11. 
14. Carlos Ferreira, Biodiversity Offsets As Corporate Responsibility: Opportunity 
or Paradox?, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE (Dec. 2, 2014), https://perma.cc/6Y46-GH9U. 
15. See generally Ives & Bekessy, supra note 2, at 568; Susan Walker, Ann Brower, 
R.T. Theo Stephens & William G. Lee, Why Bartering Biodiversity Fails, 2 CONSERVATION 
LETTERS 149, 150 (2009), https://perma.cc/VS9S-TMD8; George Monbiot, Putting a Price 
on Rivers and Rain Diminishes Us All, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2012), https://perma.cc 
/DAT8-8MJ6. 
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become as “fungible as everything else.”16  Further, they raise concerns that 
the adoption of biodiversity offsetting represents an ethical shift away from 
traditional regulatory approaches to conservation, which prohibit certain 
actions according to clearly defined statutes, to a lawless free-for-all, where 
developers can devastate remarkable places with impunity and absolution, 
as long as they offset the harm somewhere else.17 
III. Responding to Biocentric Critiques of Biodiversity 
Offsetting 
Since the introduction of biodiversity offsetting as a regulatory 
incentive mechanism, environmental ethicists have grappled with its 
implications.  According to research ecologists Martine Maron and 
Christopher Ives (“Maron, et al.”), most ethical objections to offsetting are 
born from a biocentric view of the world.18  Biocentrists maintain that all 
living things have intrinsic value, apart from any instrumental value they 
might have to humans.  Unlike the ethic of anthropocentrism, which holds 
that human beings are the primary holders of moral standing, biocentrism 
extends moral status to all living things.  Thus, for biocentrists, biodiversity 
offsetting’s “reduc[tion of] nature to exchangeable units is a fundamental 
violation of its intrinsic value.”19 
Due to the extensive commentary that flows from the ethical 
implications of offset schemes, I will address only two such critiques.  First, 
I examine the biocentric contention that nature is not fungible, and thus, 
that biodiversity offsetting is immoral; and second, I address the claim that 
the increased implementation of biodiversity offsetting will lead to a 
decreased sense of moral duty to nature.20 
1.     Nature as Fungible 
Biocentrists argue that biodiversity offsetting represents a 
“dangerous” “license to destroy;” in that they commodify the natural world 
and allow for the trashing of precious places to accommodate the 
construction of unremarkable projects that could be built elsewhere.21  
According to The Guardian columnist George Monbiot, biodiversity 
offsetting 
 
16. Monbiot, supra note 15. 
17. Ives & Bekessy, supra note 2, at 570; Monbiot, supra note 15. 
18. Maron et al., supra note 1, at 491. 
19. Id. 
20. See generally, Ives & Bekessy, supra note 2.  
21. Monbiot, supra note 15. 
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makes nature as fungible as everything else.  No place is valued 
as a place: it is broken down into a list of habitats and animals and 
plants, which could, in theory, be shifted somewhere else.  It 
subjects our landscape and wildlife to the same process of 
commodification that has blighted everything else the corporate 
economy touches…22 
 
Monbiot maintains that by accepting the principle of biodiversity 
offsetting, “you accept the idea that place means nothing.  That nowhere is 
to be valued in its own right … that everything is exchangeable for 
everything else, and nothing can be allowed to stand in the way of the 
graders and degraders.”23  To Monbiot—and to many environmental 
advocates—this idea is not easy to “swallow.”24 
These arguments reflect a fundamental aversion to market-based 
conservation schemes because they “are incongruous with nature’s intrinsic 
value.”25  In a sense, I also concede to this view.  The underlying notion of 
trading, or “bartering,” nature is, to me, personally and fundamentally 
objectionable.  There is a holiness in the quiet forest floor of the Great North 
Woods.  I stand in awe beneath the towering trees in the Redwood National 
and State Parks.  I hold tight to cherished memories of swimming in the 
chilly waters of the Androscoggin River on a hot summer’s day.  There is 
intangible, and arguably incalculable, value in a place simply as a place—
just as there is value in home, in family, or in love.  Despite the 
inexpressible sense of wonder I derive from the natural world and the 
significance of these places in my own life, I am under no illusions that 
these places are not also external commodities.  The reality is that, “[n]ature 
really may not be fungible—but if large chunks of nonhuman nature and 
functioning ecosystems are to survive, we likely must pretend it is.”26 
Nature has been monetized, prioritized, and commodified since man 
first “confused [his] human uniqueness with superiority,” and declared 
nature as under his dominion.27  When mankind entered into societal 
contracts with other humans, everything was assigned a price—either in 
money or in value.  Men traded seeds for cattle, traded cattle for food, sold 
food for coin, which could then be exchanged again for any number of 




24. Id.  
25. Ives & Bekessy, supra note 2, at 568. 
26. Tackacs, supra note 10, at 165-66. 
27. Elizabeth Dodson Gray, Come Inside the Circle of Creation: The Ethic of 
Attunement, in ETHICS AND ENVTL. POLICY: THEORY MEETS PRACTICE 21, 22 (Frederick 
Ferré & Peter Hartel eds., 1994). 
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specifically of wilderness by the elite, in the decades following the Civil 
War, writing: 
 
more and more of the nation’s wealthiest citizens [sought] out 
wilderness for themselves.  The elite passion for wild land took 
many forms: enormous estates in the Adirondacks and 
elsewhere…cattle ranches for would-be rough riders on the Great 
Plains, guided big-game hunting trips to the Rockies, and 
luxurious resort hotels wherever railroads pushed their way into 
sublime landscapes.  Wilderness suddenly emerged as a landscape 
of choice for elite tourists, who brought with them strikingly urban 
ideas of the countryside through which they traveled.  For them, 
wild land was not a site for productive labor and not a permanent 
home; rather, it was a place of recreation.  One went to the 
wilderness not as a producer but a consumer…28 
 
Ignoring the unpleasant reality that nature has been, and will continue to 
be, commodified, classified, and monetized, ultimately gets us nowhere.29   
Furthermore, those who maintain that attaching an economic value to 
nature necessarily diminishes it, overlook the fact that assigning a numeric 
value to aspects of the natural world can also highlight their significance.  
Even the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)—the internationally 
binding treaty created to promote and conserve the sustainable use, and 
equitable sharing of biodiversity—quantifies and qualifies biodiversity’s 
importance by noting that  
 
at least 40 per cent of the world’s economy, and 80 per cent of the 
needs of the poor, are derived from biological resources.  In 
addition, the richer the diversity of life, the greater the opportunity 
for medical discoveries, economic development, and adaptive 
responses to such new challenges as climate change.30 
 
Assigning a numeric attachment to the significance of biodiversity can also 
mobilize different sectors of the population that might otherwise be 
disinterested in its protection.  For example, the pollination of food crops 
of bees and other insects is “a service worth as much as $500 billion every 
 
28. WILLIAM CRONON, UNCOMMON GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN 
NATURE 78 (1996). 
29. If we didn’t accept this premise to some extent, private property rights would not 
exist. 
30. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M 818, 
1760 U.N.T.S. 79, https://perma.cc/S3FM-HFGN. 
2 - MERROW_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019  3:22 PM 




year.”31  The destruction of biodiversity has far-reaching implications on 
individuals, businesses, states, and the planet.  In a perfect world, the loss 
of biodiversity as an intrinsically valuable entity in and of itself would be 
enough to garner unwavering support for its preservation; but, in reality, 
monetizing nature can help attract players that would otherwise ignore its 
significance.   
a) Assigning Value to Biodiversity 
If we accept that—despite our own misgivings—nature must be 
treated as fungible if we hope to meet any conservation goals, the issue then 
becomes how we should evaluate the worth, or “value,” of biodiversity, so 
that it can be traded fairly and effectively in offsetting schemes.  
Biodiversity, unlike a single seed, animal, or object presents unique 
challenges for valuation because of its inherent complexity.  Ecosystems 
specifically, are “place-specific and dynamic: each is unique and 
irreplaceable.”32  Further, ecosystems (and the biodiversity within those 
ecosystems) contain  interweaving functions, processes, and living beings, 
that coexist and operate symbiotically within the surrounding environment.   
The considerable and obvious challenges of assigning a numerical 
value to such an intricate system cannot be ignored.  Even determining how 
to break down such an interconnected system into a series of isolated and 
distinct components is problematic.  When assessing the value of each 
individual component, we must first consider whose value assessments 
should factor into the equation.  How do we weigh the values of contracting 
parties and the values of the public?  How do we measure the 
immeasurable?  How can we put a price on the priceless?33 
b) Creating a Scientifically-Defensible Currency 
Those ethically or technically opposed to biodiversity offsets argue 
that “protecting biodiversity in trading is neither technically realistic nor 
administratively probable.”34  They maintain that trading in a “complex, 
noninterchangeable and poorly measurable resource such as biodiversity” 
ensures “inadequate currency, exchange restrictions, and review, to the 
detriment of that resource.”35 
 
31. Brooke Jarvis, The Insect Apocalypse Is Here, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/XV24-6YPV.  
32. Tackacs, supra note 10, at 189. 
33. Id. at 221. 
34. Walker et al., supra note 15, at 150. 
35. Id. 
2 - MERROW_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019  3:22 PM 




According to Walker, Browner, Stephens and Lee (“Walker et al.”), 
“[v]iable biodiversity barter and meaningful biodiversity protection seem 
mutually exclusive.”36  They maintain that the absence of credible solutions 
to the problems biodiversity offsetting raises presents a situation where 
“[w]e can achieve one or the other, but not both.”37  Their arguments 
suggest that to create a workable, functioning exchange program, simple 
currencies are necessary, and biodiversity’s complexity cannot be 
quantified into a single unit.38  Additionally, due to the uneven playing field 
between developer, government, and public interests, without a universal 
exchange policy, biodiversity offsetting will “be more vulnerable to the 
institutional failings that undermine environmental protection than 
simple…prohibitions.”39 
Salzman and Ruhl noted that the test of a currency’s adequacy is 
whether it “can capture the significant values exchanged or [if] some 
important features remain external to the trades.”40  Unlike other easily 
measured environmental offset schemes, such as carbon offsets, 
biodiversity’s intricate entanglement of functions, processes, ecosystems, 
and life forms, make effective value assessments uniquely puzzling.  The 
goal is to create a scientifically defensible measurement that captures “what 
we care about.”41 
To make biodiversity offsetting a viable trading program, “currencies 
must be simple, review cannot be onerous, and restrictions must be 
straightforward and few.”42  This makes biodiversity offsetting additionally 
problematic, as creating a value currency to facilitate trade involves many 
(often competing) interests, value assessments, and scientific data.  
Furthermore, proposed project developers, who fund the scientific data in 
most biodiversity offset schemes, are more interested in seeing the project 
built than they are concerned about the loss of biodiversity associated with 
the project. 
Walker, et al. note that, “if ‘what we care about’ is persistence of the 
full variety of life, contributions of different biodiversity elements are 
noninterchangeable.”43  While I concede that the nontransferable quality of 
biodiversity makes it impossible to trade in the exact sense, formulating 
 
36. Id. at 155.  
37. Id. 
38. Id.  
39. Id.  
40. Id. at 151. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 153. 
43. Id. at 150. 
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value assessments of ecosystems is possible, and should be fashioned, 
however imperfectly. 
Determining the worth of something is usually personal and 
subjective.  Indeed, sometimes we have trouble communicating our own 
value assessments to others or understanding the logic behind the values 
we hold.  I acknowledge that, although offsets may never fully reflect the 
value of an ecosystem’s biodiversity to all human and non-human entities, 
if we are to implement biodiversity offsetting in the most effective way 
possible, incorporating the value assessments of as many parties as possible 
is imperative.  Because biodiversity trading affects interests beyond those 
of the direct participants, implementing offsets without public participation 
can (and will) erode the public’s interest in public resources.44  However, 
adopting biodiversity offsetting legislation at the regional, national, and 
international levels that contain clear guidelines, allowances, and 
restrictions will result in better conservation outcomes.  Additionally, by 
mandating the incorporation of language that requires the participation of 
all affected parties in the negotiations of offsetting programs, it is possible 
to create a “rubric” for assessing the value of an ecosystem.  I acknowledge 
that such a rubric will undoubtedly have its problems—especially at the 
implementation phase45 —and will not adequately reflect some individuals’ 
value assessments.  However, the hope is that over time this rubric will 
morph into an equitable and workable measurement tool.  The reality is, we 
will not know what works if we do not try. 
2.   The Increased Implementation of Biodiversity 
Offsetting Will Not Lead to a Decreased Sense of Moral 
Duty to Nature, Unless We Let it. 
Ives and Bekessy contend that biodiversity offsetting “represents a 
major shift in how nature is protected.”46  They claim that by focusing on 
the outcomes of certain acts, instead of the acts themselves, biodiversity 
offsetting diverges from the traditional justification for biodiversity 
legislation.  They argue that traditional environmental legislation is most 
strongly supported by a deontological view of the world.47  They frame 
 
44. Id. at 151 (citing Bo Gustafsson, Scope and Limits of the Market Mechanism in 
Environmental Management, 24 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 259 (1998); James Salzman & J. B. 
Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 
(2000); Timm Kroeger & Frank A. Casey, An Assessment of Market-Based Approahes to 
Providing Ecosystem Services on Agricultural Lands, 64 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 321 (2007)). 
45. Not to mention the challenges presented in an attempt to get such legislation 
passed. 
46. Ives & Bekessy, supra note 2, at 568. 
47. Id. 
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deontology as “the moral concept that people should not harm biodiversity, 
or the integrity of the environment should be upheld.”48  Other 
environmental theorists, such as Maron et. al., allege that “offset exchanges 
seem to imply an acceptance of an anthropocentric philosophy and a focus 
on use or existence values” that are otherwise absent from traditional 
environmental legislation.49 
While I accept that in its current structure biodiversity offsetting is 
less about statutory allowances or restrictions on specific conduct, I do not 
agree that this change reflects a departure from traditional ethical principles 
or that it will erode our sense of obligation to the natural world.  In 
evaluating this position, I turn to the Endangered Species Act (ESA)—
considered to be the most comprehensive environmental law in the world—
which uses explicit statutory restrictions and allowances to achieve the 
ultimate goal of protecting endangered and threatened species.  Ives and 
Bekessy consider the ESA an example of “traditional biodiversity 
legislation” because it clearly allows for certain actions and explicitly 
prohibits others (such as the “taking” of an endangered species).50 
When Congress passed the ESA in 1973, it recognized that “species 
of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, 
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people.”51  As noted 
by the Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the legislative 
proceedings of the ESA are “replete with expressions of concern over the 
risk that might lie in the loss of any endangered species.”52  The 
legislature’s concern over the loss of species is best summarized by the 
legislative history leading up to the ESA’s passage in 1973,53 which 
provides: 
 
As we homogenize the habitats in which these plants and 
animals evolved, and as we increase the pressure for products that 
they are in a position to supply (usually unwillingly) we threaten 
their—and our own—genetic heritage. The value of this genetic 




49. Maron et al., supra note 1, at 491 (citing James Justus et al., Buying into 
Conservation: Instrinsic Versus Instrumental Value, 24 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 
187 (2009)). 
50. Ives & Bekessy, supra note 2, at 569. 
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (1973). 
52. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 177, (1978). 
53. Id. at 177-78. 
54. Id. at 178. 
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Although many consider the ESA to be the most “radical” environmental 
law in existence, it was born from a self-interested anthropocentric view of 
nature.55  The legislature noted that genetic variations of plants, fish and 
wildlife are “potential resources” to human beings.  “They are keys to 
puzzles which we cannot solve, and they may provide answers to questions 
which we have not yet learned to ask.”56 
 
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or 
other scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the 
structures of plants which may yet be undiscovered, much less 
analyzed? . . . Sheer self-interest impels us to be cautious.57 
 
All environmental laws, regardless of their effectiveness in protecting or 
conserving nature, are born from an anthropocentric self-interest.  
Similarly, any and all value assessments we place on the natural world are 
still human constructs.  To argue that biodiversity offsets somehow alter 
this established paradigm ignores these established truths. 
Critics of biodiversity offsetting rightfully reject its label as a 
“conservation” tool when it should be treated as a new development ethic.  
For example, critics have noted the problems with the symbolic policy 
language of “no net loss” and “net gain”;58 reasoning that, “while 
compensation and no net loss are worthy goals, and bartering biodiversity 
might appear more promising than simple and weakly enforced 
prohibitions … policies that enable biodiversity trading may perversely 
yield worse biodiversity outcomes.”59 
Framing biodiversity offsets as a “conservation tool” is categorically 
misleading.  Claiming that offsets result in “no net loss” or a “net gain” in 
biodiversity is similarly disingenuous—particularly because there is 
currently no effective means of measuring biodiversity’s value.  Ives and 
Bekessy argue that “[a]llowing for the buying and selling of nature may 
counteract the development of respectful, positive societal attitudes toward 
nature.”60  They claim that “[w]hile offsetting might make it economically 
less viable to destroy biodiversity, it rests on the assumption that there is 
 
55. The legislative history of the ESA specifically notes that “it is in the best 
interests of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variations” because of the value 
such genetic variations potentially offer human beings. (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 
U.S. 153, at 178).  
56. See id. (quoting H.R. 37). 
57. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973)).  
58. Walker et al., supra note 15, at 154-55. 
59. Id. at 155.  
60. Ives & Bekessy, supra note 2, at 572. 
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nothing wrong per se with the manipulation and trading of nature, and may 
therefore undermine [respect for nature as] a virtue.”61  
Because I maintain, albeit regrettably, that man has already 
commodified nature since he entered into societal contracts, to frame 
biodiversity offsets in the language of development—rather than in the 
language of conservation—creates a new, previously unaccepted 
development ethic.  Instead of simply destroying nature for the sake of 
development, as we have for millennia, the practice of biodiversity 
offsetting represents a shift toward fostering an ethic of obligation to 
consider and conserve ecosystems during development.  Instead of 
demonizing the trading scheme as immoral, we should instead celebrate the 
genesis of this newly-minted obligation to the natural world.  Rather than 
assuming that the implementation of offsetting diminishes humanity’s 
responsibilities to nature, we should champion the ethic that we are 
obligated to enhance nature whenever we destroy it. 
“Rather than sink into a mire of despair,” seeing “biodiversity 
offsetting as one element of hopeful, sound, savvy planning [that could] 
carry humans and nonhumans with which we share the planet into the 
Anthropocene” seems, to me, the better option.62  Incorporating 
biodiversity offsetting into the plans for development projects would help 
reinforce mankind’s obligations to nature.  Additionally, focusing on 
incorporating nature into all development plans—such as building green 
spaces into development projects—would further nurture mankind’s 
connection and relationship to the natural world.63  I do not pretend that the 
implementation of this practice will not come without many technical and 
social challenges.  I also recognize the very real fundamental imbalance of 
power and interests in the marketplace which can provide “another transfer 
of power to corporations and the very rich,” if we let transfers go 
unchecked.64  However, the rising popularity of biodiversity offsetting 
gives me hope.  Although it arguably reinforces the idea that nature is 
fungible, it also codifies a renewed obligation and responsibility to the 
natural world that was altogether absent from the development practices of 
the modern world.  If biodiversity truly is “the key to the maintenance of 
the world as we know it,”65 by refocusing our energies and harnessing our 
collective power to progress change, biodiversity offsets are a beacon of 
light in an otherwise dark and dismal future.  
 
 
61. Id.  
62. Takacs, supra note 10, at 198. 
63. See generally, Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the 
Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 325 (2002), https://perma.cc/R67T-ZS9J. 
64. Monbiot, supra note 15. 
65. EDWARD O. WILSON, DIVERSITY OF LIFE, 15 (1992). 
